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The Commonwealth of Virginia, like other states in the United
States, has been very much preoccupied during the past 5 years with
problems of legislative reapportionment and redistricting. For the past
3 years, State concern with redistricting problems has been prodded
by suits which sought to compensate for the earlier failures of the
political process to bring about equal representation in the State legis-
lature, congressional districts, and on municipal governing bodies.
Stimulated by Baker v. Carr,1 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1962, litigation successfully challenged the apportionment of
both houses of the General Assembly, the composition of the State's
10 congressional districts, and representation on the councils of 2 Vir-
ginia cities. A reapportionment or redistricting was brought about in
each instance. Only county governing bodies in Virginia thus far
have escaped challenge in the courts.
The Virginia experience in the national "Reapportionment Revolu-
tion" is not unique. Most other states have been deeply involved in re-
apportionment and redistricting activities. But Virginia faced reap-
portionment crises on all levels of government in a relatively short
period of time. What perhaps most distinguishes Virginia in the midst
of the reapportionment problems afflicting the states is its response to
the judicial insistence upon one man one vote standards for legislative
representation. Virginia legislated acceptable plans for redistricting
both houses of the General Assembly, the State's 10 congressional dis-
tricts, and at least 1 city council without the delaying tactics and
bitter acrimony characteristic of some other states. Undoubtedly,
part of the explanation for Virginia's compliant response to the de-
mands of equal representation lies in the fact that deviations from that
principle were not deeply rooted in the State's political traditions.
In addition, the political impact of reapportionment in the Common-
wealth was not so great as to produce immediate and substantial re-
- A.B. 1952, A.M. 1953, University of Illinois; M.A. 1957, Ph.D. 1961, Princeton
University; Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Assistant
Director of the Institute of Government, University of Virginia.
1369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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alignments of political power in this decade. Finally, the legislative
process in Virginia takes place in an environment of strong majority
party control of both houses of the General Assembly which serves to
reduce the probability of deadlock on reapportionment solutions.
It is appropriate to examine the Virginia involvement in reapportion-
ment on the 2 levels of government where the reapportionment
issue finally has been closed. Litigation further challenging the ap-
portionment of city councils is still under way. This article will focus
on the Virginia legislative and congressional cases and not attempt to
treat the numerous other issues of reapportionment raised in cases
affecting other states.
The Virginia cases did not raise the panoply of issues and questions
which had to be confronted by courts sitting in other states. Malap-
portionment of the Virginia legislature was not a result of long-stand-
ing legislative failure to act to reapportion. The Virginia Constitution
did not provide explicitly for the composition of legislative districts
nor contain formulas for apportionment which produced inherent
inequalities in representation. No question of a "Federal analogy" was
really pertinent to the Virginia General Assembly since an area
concept of representation had not been applied to either legislative
chamber. The relevance of an initiative or referendum process to
the selection of an apportionment system was not present.
What a population standard required when it was applied was
perhaps the most vital question of apportionment. How close to
population equality legislative districts must be was the primary
operational problem of the one man-one vote standard for apportion-
ment adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. This problem was faced
directly by the Federal court in the Virginia case well in advance of
Reynolds v. Sims.2 The manner in which the problem was resolved in
the Virginia litigation suggested the later approach of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Peripheral issues were present in the Virginia cases. But the only
issues of consequence related to the permissible disparities in the popu-
lation size of legislative districts, the rationale or "proof" required to
justify larger disparities, and the ingredients of population which
could be used to structure districts. After Baker, Gray, and Wes-
berry,3 and the cases decided by Federal and state courts elsewhere,
the inherent questions posed in applying a population standard were
2377 U.S. 533 (1964).
sBaker v. Carr, supra note 1; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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the only difficult issues in the Virginia litigation. The State court's
resolution of the question in the congressional case, relying upon its
own precedent, as well as that of the Federal courts in the legislative
case, similarly was a reasonable approach to the problem, although
the outcome was never seriously in doubt. Virginia's historic applica-
tion of a population standard for representation made the judicial
problem a little simpler, as it enabled the courts to concentrate upon
the meaning of population for apportionment purposes.
I. THE GENE AL ASSEMBLY
The challenge to the apportionment of representation in the Virginia
General Assembly culminated in the case being one of the famed
"Reapportionment Cases" decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 15, 1964.4 Davis v. Mann, the Virginia case,5 was in-
cluded among the cases from 5 other states for the Supreme Court
to rule on standards of representation for state legislaturesP
The Virginia reapportionment case had roots in the results of the
1960 Federal census. Although the State's population had increased by
over 19% since 1950, the rate of population increase was unevenly
distributed throughout Virginia.7 Most of the State's increase in popula-
tion occurred in a crescent shaped corridor of counties and cities
extending from the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, D. C.,
southward to the Richmond metropolitan area, thence eastward to the
Tidewater cities and counties of Hampton Roads." Illustrative of the
uneven population growth were Fairfax County's increase of 179% in
population in 10 years, Alexandria's 47% increase, and Norfolk's
40% increase. On the other hand, the populations of other counties
and cities of the State either remained relatively constant or suffered
decreases since the previous census.9
The inevitable uneven population movements in Virginia exag-
gerated the disparities in the population of legislative districts both
for the election of State senators and members of the House of Dele-
4
McKAY, REAPPoRTIONME.xT: TnE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQuAL REPREsENTATIox
vii (1965).
5213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962).
OThe other states were Alabama, Delaware, Colorado, Maryland, and New
York.
7U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, Census of Population: General Population
Characteristics, Virginia (1961).
8Lorin A. Thompson, "Recent Population Changes In Virginia," 37 The
University of Virginia News Letter 21 (Feb. 15, 1961).
91bid.
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gates. The 2 delegates elected from the district embracing Fairfax
County and the City of Falls Church each represented 142,597 per-
sons; the City of Alexandria's delegate represented 91,023 persons.
Other areas and the number of constituents per delegate were:
Princess Anne County and the City of Virginia Beach, 85,218; the
City of Portsmouth, 57,386; Arlington County, 54,467; and the City of
Norfolk, 50,812. At the other extreme, 5 delegates were elected from
individual districts ranging in size from 20,071 to 23,201. A similar
situation prevailed in the State Senate. Each of the 2 senators from
the City of Norfolk represented 152,435 persons, while Arlington
County's single senator had 163,401 constituents, and Fairfax County
and the City of Falls Church had 1 senator for a population of
285,194. However, 9 State senators were elected from districts which
contained populations of less than 70,000. These extremes in the popu-
lation size of districts contrasted with the 39,669 persons and 99,174
persons which each delegate and senator would ideally represent if
an equal population standard for apportionment were applied. 10 The
discrepancies in the number of people represented by the various State
senators and delegates dramatized the need for a reapportionment of
the General Assembly.
The Virginia Constitution provides for decennial reapportionment
of the legislature. § 43 of the Constitution asserts:
The present apportionment of the Commonwealth in the Sen-
atorial and House Districts shall continue; but a reapportionment
shall be made in the year nineteen hundred and thirty-two and
every ten years thereafter.:"
This provision in its present form was inserted in the Constitution by
an amendment adopted in 1928 which did not, however, make any sub-
stantive change in the original provision of the 1902 Constitution. The
1902 Constitution continued the apportionment of the legislature enact-
ed by the General Assembly in April 1902 but permitted a reappor-
tionment to be made in 1906. However, the 1902 Constitution directed
that a reapportionment "shall be made in the year 1912, and every
tenth year thereafter." 12
The provisions of the Virginia Constitution indicate that reappor-
tionment of both houses of the General Assembly was obligatory upon
'oSee Ralph Eisenberg, "Legislative Apportionment: How Representative Is
Virginia's Present System?" 37 The University of Virginia News Letter 29 (Apr.
15, 1961).
lV. CoNsr., § 43.
2Ibid.
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the General Assembly. The Constitution is clear that a reapportion-
ment is to be enacted at the first regular session of the legislature
following the Federal decennial census, since Virginia's regular bien-
nial legislative sessions occur in even years.'3 However, the Virginia
Constitution does not mention the standards to be used in reapportion-
ing State legislative representation. The omission of standards for re-
apportioning the General Assembly is in marked contrast to the con-
stitutional provisions concerning the redistricting of congressional dis-
tricts in the State. In regard to congressional districts, the Constitution
provides that:
districts shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory
containing as nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabi-
tants.14
The absence of an explicit population standard for representation in
the legislature did not suggest that the General Assembly was free to
apportion representation in any manner that it deemed appropriate,
although arguments to this effect have been developed in recent years
as the concentrations of urban population have become more pro-
nounced. It can be suggested that the requirement to reapportion 2
years after a decennial census was not merely coincidental. Each
census presumably would demonstrate the need for a redrawing of
legislative district lines to accommodate population movements over
the previous decade. Linking the time to reapportion to a legislative
session following the census was not new to Virginia constitutions.
A brief recitation of the provisions of Virginia constitutions concern-
ing reapportionment and standards for representation provides a use-
ful background to the current constitutional provisions.
The original Constitution of Virginia, adopted in 1776, provided
that each county would elect 2 representatives to the House of Dele-
gates while the City of Williamsburg and the Borough of Norfolk
would each elect 1 representative. But the Constitution went on to
provide for a representative from each city or borough as it was
created and, perhaps more significantly, when any such city or
borough decreased in its number of voters for 7 successive years
so that its voters totaled less than half of the voters in any 1 county
of the State, that city or borough would cease to have a representative
in the House of Delegates.15 In a sense, these provisions took cog-
'3 VA. CoNs?., § 46.
'4VA. CONST., § 55.
15VA. CONS?. 1776, § 5.
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nizance of the relevance of population as an apportionment standard,
although the principle itself was not enunciated.
The Constitution adopted in 1830 reflected concern with the repre-
sentation of the western and eastern sections of the State. At that
time sectional differences in the State were pronounced. The Con-
vention which drafted the Constitution adopted a compromise to
meet the demands of western Virginia for increased representation in
the legislature. The Constitution apportioned representation among
4 major sections of the State and the representatives for each section
were then distributed among its constituent counties and cities pri-
marily upon the basis of white population. But the Constitution also
provided that when any municipal body not entitled to separate repre-
sentation grew in population size sufficiently to merit representation on
its own, the General Assembly's duty was to secure representation to
such a city, town, or borough even if it was necessary to reapportion
the representatives in that great section of the State."' The 1830 Con-
stitution first declared the duty of the legislature to reapportion "in
the year 1841 and every 10 years thereafter."
The 1851 Constitution did away with the allocation of representa-
tives among the 4 great districts of the State. In its place, the Constitu-
tion described specifically the composition of legislative districts and
the number of representatives to be elected from each.'Y This Consti-
tution also affirmed the duty of the legislature to reapportion every
10 years if it could agree upon a principle of representation. But if
no agreement on a principle of representation occurred, the Constitu-
tion contemplated that the electorate would decide which of 4 alterna-
tive representative systems would be used: (1) a suffrage basis (num-
ber of voters in the several counties and cities), (2) the amount of all
State taxes paid in the counties and cities, (3) a mixed basis combining
the number of inhabitants and the amount of State taxes paid, and (4)
a mixed basis in the Senate and a suffrage basis in the House of Dele-
gates.' The alternatives more closely approximated a population
standard than did the requirements of earlier constitutions.
The 1864 Constitution again described specifically the composition
of legislative districts and allocated varying numbers of legislators to
districts across the State. That Constitution also stated the duty of the
legislature to reapportion representation in both legislative chambers in
1870 and "every tenth year thereafter .. .from an enumeration of
16VA. CONST. 1830, art. III, §§ 4 and 5.
1
7VA. CoNsT. 1851, art. IV, § 5.
lSIbid.
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the inhabitants of the state." 19 The 1869 Constitution did not specify
the composition of legislative districts nor provide a standard for
legislative apportionment. It provided for a reapportionment in 1879
and stipulated that a reapportionment "shall be made in the year 1891
and every tenth year thereafter." 20 This allusion to the legislature's re-
apportionment duty has remained in constitutional provisions ever
since.
The Constitutional Convention of 1901-02 apparently was not con-
cerned with the question of legislative apportionment. The Conven-
tion produced the vague statement noted above of the duty of the
General Assembly to reapportion.2' The constitutional statement
merely updated the provisions of the preceding constitution.
If the State's constitutional concern with reapportionment implicitly
connoted a population standard, Virginia's legislative performance in
reapportioning under the 1902 Constitution indicates an understanding
of population as the primary guideline for structuring representative
districts in both houses. Unlike other states, which were distinguished
by their failure to reapportion for 60 years or more despite constitu-
tional provisions for decennial reapportionment, Virginia has regularly
reapportioned legislative representation since 1902. Except for the State
Senate in 1906 and 1912, the Virginia General Assembly has reap-
portioned after each census in accordance with § 43 of the Constitu-
tion.2 Some legislative reluctance was evident in the delay in re-
apportioning the State Senate in 1934. However, the relationship of
Virginia's legislative apportionment systems throughout this period to
a population standard was closer than in other states. 23 These factors
indicate to many observers that Virginia's standard for legislative
apportionment was principally a population standard. 4
Legislative and special study commissions in Virginia considered
population to be the principal basis for apportioning representation
1 9VA. CoNsT. 1864, art. IV, § 6.2 0VA. CONsr. 1869, art. V, S 4.
21VA. CoNsr., § 43.
22House of Delegates apportionment: 1906 Acts, c. 83; 1910 Acts, c. 7; 1922
Acts, c. 271; 1923 Acts, Ex. Sess., c. 14; 1932 Acts, c. 169; 1942 Acts, c. 387; 1948
Acts, c. 407; 1952 Acts, Ex. Sess., c. 18; 1958 Acts, c. 33.
State Senate apportionment: 1922 Acts, c. 271; 1923 Acts, Ex. Sess, c. 14; 1934
Acts, c. 169; 1942 Acts, c. 387; 1948 Acts, c. 407; 1952 Acts, Ex. Sess, c. 17; 1958
Acts, c. 333.
23See DAVID & EIENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN V-roE,
vol. 1, at 1-5, 11-15, 64 (1961) and vol. II, at 164-70 (1962).
24See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATI AppoRTION-
?iwr (1961 ed.); BAxER, STATE CONsTITUTION: REAPPORTIONMENT 70 (1960);
McKay, op. cit. supra note 4, at 474-75.
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in both houses of the General Assembly. A legislative committee in
1940 conceded that the timing of the reapportionment duty "argues an
obvious intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution that
the population figures should be a major consideration in redistrict-
ing." The committee, however, noted the absence of a specific state-
ment of population as a controlling standard and concluded "that it
was intended to allow the General Assembly discretion to modify
the population basis in line with other factors which must be con-
sidered." 5 A Commission on Redistricting which reported in 1951
reached a similar conclusion but added: "Equality of population is not
mandatory and the General Assembly may concede such factors as
it deems appropriate .... ,, 26
. The increasing reluctance of the legislature to redistrict the General
Assembly became evident after the 1950 Census. The first regular
session of the General Assembly failed to enact. redistricting legisla-
tion in 1952. Governor John S. Battle had to call a special. session to
reapportion both legislative chambers. In 1960 Governor J. Lindsay
Almond asked the General Assembly to create a commission to study
the need for legislative reapportionment and congressional redistrict-
ing, but legislation for that purpose was not enacted. Governor Al-
mond in early 1961, therefore, appointed a Commission on Redistrict-
ing. A. legislator and a citizen were appointed to the Commission 7
from each of the State's 10 congressional districts.
The Commission on Redistricting in its report, submitted to the
Governor and the General Assembly in November 1961, proposed
redistricting plans for both the State Senate and the Iouse of Dele-
gates.28 The Commission's proposals contemplated the shift of 3
Senate seats and 8 Delegate seats from less populous to more populous
areas of the State. Its plans were guided by concern for "the factors
of compactness, contiguity, ease of access and communication, com-
munity of interest, and a reasonable degree of equality of representa-
tion." 9
The 1962 General Assembly fulfilled its reapportionment responsi-
bility for both legislative houses, but it did not enact the apportion-
ment plans recommended by the Commission on Redistricting. The
S251940 House Document #6, Report of the Commission on Redistricting of
House and Senatorial Districts 14.
211951 House Document #15, Report of the Commission on Redistricting
6-7.
27Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 17, 1961, pp. 1, 3.
28Virginia, REP RT OF THE CoMMIssIoN ON REDISTRICfING, Nov. 15, 1961.
291d. at 8.
1966] REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING - 303
1962 redistricting merely shifted 1 Senate seat and 3 Delegate seats to
urban areasP0 It appeared that the redistricting was merely a token
effort in the direction of equality of representation in both houses.
Table I indicates in statistical terms the limited scope of the 1962 re-
districting.
TABLE I
VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MEASURES OF REPRESENTATIVENESS
BEFORE AND AFTER 1962 REDISTRICTING
STATE SENATE HOUSE oF DELEGATES
Ratio of Percent of Ratio of Percent of
Largest Population Largest Population
District Necessary District Necessary
to to Elect a . to to Elect a
Smallest Majority Smallest Majority
District of Members 'District of Members
Prior to 1962 Redistricting.. 5.5 37.7 7.1 36.8
After 1962 Redistricting .... 2.4 41.1 4.4 40.5
Based on 1960 population figures.
The most underrepresented areas of the State, however, were not
provided with the additional legislators to which their populations
would have entitled them. Only I additional senator and 1 delegate
were allocated to Fairfax County and Falls Church, while Norfolk re-
ceived no increases in its representation. Thus, in the Senate, Norfolk
had only 65% of the representation to which on a population basis it
would have had, while Fairfax County had 70%, and Arlington Coun-
ty, only 61%. In the House of Delegates the situation was much the
same with Fairfax County having 42%, Hampton City 44%, Arlington
County 73%, and Norfolk 78% of the delegate representation a popu-
lation-based apportionment would have provided. There were, in con-
trast, 4 Senate districts in rural areas which were overrepresented by at
least 50% and 8 Delegate districts which were also overrepresented by
at least 50%.
Governor Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., in signing the redistricting bills,
had acknowledged "the disparity in population between some dis-
tricts." The Governor expressed his view of apportionment standards
in Virginia in the following terms:
Historically, population has been utilized as the principal factor
in redistricting in Virginia, although population alone has never
301962 Acts, c. 635, c. 638.
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been deemed the sole basis of redistricting. The General Assembly
-properly, I think-has always considered not only population,
but also geographical area, the number of political subdivisions
within a district, terrain, and community of interest, in drawing
district lines....
Unless equality of population be permitted to overbalance com-
pletely all considerations of compactness, contiguity, habit, con-
venience of the people, and community of interest, I am convinced
that the present plan is a fair reapportionment of Virginia's legisla-
tive representation. 1
To justify the equity of the redistricting acts, the Governor cited
factors of geographic diversity and geographic barriers and the need to
have few political subdivisions within legislative districts. He particu-
larly emphasized Virginia's comparatively high standing among the
rest of the states in the relation of its legislative apportionment to
population,
The legal attack on the 1962 redistricting acts was launched on
April 9, 1962, when suit was filed in Alexandria in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by 4 legislators from
Northern Virginia.3 2 The plaintiffs contended that they were denied
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, because the 1962 redistricting
acts prevented them from casting votes as effective as those cast by
voters ,resident in overrepresented legislative districts. The plaintiffs
maintained that the 1962 acts invidiously discriminated against them
and other voters in districts where effective votes were similarly
diluted. They pointed out that the redistricting acts permitted a
minority of the people of Virginia to control the General Assembly.
The suit sought injunctive relief to prevent elections from being held
under the 1962 apportionment or under the existing (1952) apportion-
ment system. It is to be noted how soon after Baker v. Carr,3 decided
on March 26, 1962, the Virginia case was filed.
The 3-judge panel appointed to consider the complaint consisted
of Judge Albert V. Bryan of the Court of Appeals of the 4th
Circuit, Judge Oren R. Lewis of Alexandria, and Judge Walter E.
Hoffman of Norfolk, both of the Eastern District of Virginia.
The Court. permitted plaintiffs from Norfolk, who alleged'that they
3IStatement by Governor Harrison re: HB 250 and SB 145, Apr. 7, 1962.
-uThe 4 plaintiffs were Delegates Harrison Mann and Kathryn Stone of Arling-
ton County, and-Delegate John C. Webb and Senator John A. K. Donovan of
Fairfax County.
33Supra note 1.
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suffered the same inequalities as Northern Virginia voters, to intervene
in the case. After hearing the case on October 22 and 23, the District
Court handed down its decision on November 28, 1962, with Judge
Bryan writing the opinion for the majority and Judge Hoffman dis-
senting.3
4
The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint,
noting that Baker v. Carr "unequivocally declares ...that allegations
comparable to those now before us state a claim upon which the re-
lief here prayed may be granted." 35 The Court also refused to
grant dismissal upon other grounds claimed by the defendants. Dis-
missal was not justified because the Court did not see the "'exceptional
circumstances'" present for the State remedy "to oust Federal juris-
diction." 36 Judge Bryan denied the defendants' contention that the
suit was one against the State barred by the Eleventh Amendment
and held that it ". . . was against State officials acting pursuant to State
laws, a type of action universally held appropriate to vindicate a
Federally protected right." 3 7 The Court, however, did sustain the mo-
tion to dismiss the Governor and Attorney General as defendants be-
cause they did not have a "'special relation'" to the elections.38
To the contention that the Federal court should abstain from de-
ciding the case until State courts had had an opportunity to review
and interpret the redistricting acts and the relevant State constitution-
al provisions, Judge Bryan answered that the redistricting acts were
not ambiguous and the constitutional provisions were not unclear. The
acts, he noted, were specific and the Constitution alluded to no
special local considerations:
Whether the acts of the Assembly are within the aim and pur-
pose of the Constitution can, therefore, be gained only from the
bare words of its clauses, fair inferences from the acts themselves
34Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962). For a description of early
developments in the case see Eisenberg, "Reapportionment: Journey Through a
Judicial Thicket," in CASES IN AMERICAN NATIONAl. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS,
182-94 (Tresolini & Frost ed. 1966).
35Mann v. Davis, supra note 34, at 579.
36lbid. The court cited the following cases to support its position: Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939); United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 291 F.2d
677, 679 (10th Cir. 1961); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
37Mann v. Davis, supra note 34, at 579. Judge Bryan cited the following cases
to support this view: Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908); Duckworth
v. James, 267 F.2d 224, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959);
Kansas City So. Ry. v. Daniel, 180 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1950).
38Mann v. Davis, supra note 34, at 579, noting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
157 (1908).
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and commentary evidence. This determination is thus as well
within the competence of a Federal court sitting in Virginia.
Furthermore, the strong implication of Baker v. Carr, if not
its command, is that the Federal three-judge court should retain
and resolve the litigation.3 9
As to the merits of the plaintiffs' allegations, Judge Bryan de-
clared that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
demanded that apportionment afford "substantially equal representa-
tion" to the State's citizens, and he then examined the disparities in the
population size of districts in both legislative houses. He noted the
obvious inequalities in the voting power of various legislative districts
and, while asserting that population was not "the sole or definitive mea-
sure of districts when taken by the Equal Protection Clause," 40 de-
clared that the burden of proof to justify the disparities among the
districts fell upon the defendants. Judge Bryan admitted the existence
of factors other than population to be weighed in evaluating the just-
ness of an apportionment, but he concluded that population was the
predominant apportionment standard under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The other relevant factors were compactness and contiguity,
community of interest, observance of "natural lines," and adherence to
the boundaries of political subdivisions. But there had to be evidence
that such factors were actually considered in constructing legislative
districts. In Virginia, his opinion concluded, no such evidence was
forthcoming.
The defendants had contended that a factor explaining the varia-
tions in the districts was the number of military persons located in
Arlington and Fairfax counties and in the City of Norfolk. Judge
Bryan said, however, that the evidence presented was not explicit or
satisfactory. The majority of the Court, speaking through the opinion,
asserted "there must be a fair approach to equality unless it be shown
that other acceptable factors may make up for the differences in the
numbers of people." 41 Two of the 3 members of the Court obviously
felt that no demonstration of the application of other factors had been
made in defense of the 1962 redistricting.
The Court refused to distinguish between the 2 legislative houses in
the application of a population standard for apportionment. Judge
Bryan commented briefly that the state Senate was not a "regional
39Mann v. Davis, supra note 34, at 580.
4Od. at 584.
441hid.
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counterpart" 42 of the United States, and that State Senate districts did
not have State autonomy. The Court thus concluded that it could
find "no rational basis for the disfavoring of Arlington, Fairfax, and
Norfolk." 43 Without setting any permissible tolerances in mathemati-
cal terms for the disparities in district size and without declaring that
wide differences between districts cannot be tolerated "if a, sound
reason cannot be advanced," the Court held "unconstitutional, in-
vidious discrimination adverse to Arlington, Fairfax, and Norfolk
has been proved." 4
Judge Bryan's opinion in Mann v. Davis was one of the better ap-
portionment opinions in this early period of reapportionment litigation
in lower Federal and state courts. The opinion is admirably concise
and the reasoning is clear and to the point. The substantial issues were
treated as their significance merited and they were met directly. The
opinion was particularly outstanding for the reasonable approach to
the concept of equal representation as reflected in the population
characteristics of legislative districts. The Court perceived the difficulty
of achieving mathematical exactness in the population size of districts
and did not attempt to establish an exact standard for acceptable dis-
tricting. Although population was declared the principal standard
for- legislative districts, the Court admitted the relevance of other
factors in assessing the constitutionality of an apportionment system.
In these respect§, the Court generally anticipated the subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court approach to the problem. In viewing population as the
primary basis for representation and examining deviations from popu-
lation equality in terms of rational use of non-population factors, the
Court. took a reasonable view of the difficulties- and objectives of the
redistricting process. The- most significant feature of Mann v. ,Davi-
was to place the responsibility for justifying departures from popula-
tion- equality upon the State-and to demand evidence -of the rationality
and relevance of the factors offered in defense of districts of disparate
size. The failure to produce a rational explanation for Virginia's re-
districting acts of 1962 proved fatal.
Judge Hoffman's dissent argued that because the U.S. Supreme
Court had provided only limited guidance ,in the reapportionment
area, the inequalities in Virginia's 1962 redistricting acts did not con-
clusively constitute invidious discrimination. Judge Hoffman was im-
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comparison to the representative nature of other state legislatures.45
Data furnished the Court by the State indicated that at that time, Vir-
ginia ranked 10th among the states in the minimum proportion of
population that could elect majorities in both legislative houses. He
also noted that even the extreme disparities in the size of Virginia
districts were considerably less than in other states where apportion-
ment systems had been invalidated and in some cases upheld in the
courts. Judge Hoffman contended that there were too many un-
answered questions about apportionment to justify invalidating Vir-
ginia's redistricting effort. He felt that State courts should have an
opportunity to, assess the apportionment system while the District
Court retained jurisdiction. If the State courts invalidated the appor-
tionment using superior knowledge of local conditions, the General
Assembly could reexamine State policies and Federal interference
might be unnecessary. Nevertheless, Judge Hoffman's principal differ-
ence with the majority lay in his conviction that insufficient guidelines
existed to decide the case. It is significant that he did not suggest that
he was impressed by the relevance of military population or, other
factors cited in defense of the redistricting.
The Court entered a judgment declaring the 1962 redistricting acts
invalid -but stayed the effect of the injunction until January 31, 1963,
so that either an appeal could be taken to the U.S. Supreme Court
or a special session of the General Assembly could be convened to
reapportion. The Court retained jurisdiction of the case but said that
further stays would have to be secured from the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Attorney General of Virginia on December 10 requested a stay
of the lower court order and Chief Justice Earl Warren issued the
stay on.December 15 to permit an appeal to the Supreme Court. The
stay permitted the General Assembly to be elected in November 1963
on the basis of the 1962 redistricting acts. On June 9, 1963, the Supreme
Court announced that it would review the lower court decision along
with cases from 5 other states. The cases were scheduled for argu-
ment beginning November 12. The decision in Dasds v. Mann was not
handed down until June 15, 1964.
In the interim, suit was filed in State court by 2 citizens of Norfolk
alleging that the 1962 redistricting acts violated § 43 of the Virginia
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Originally filed in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, the case
4 5
In the summer of 1962, Virginia ranked 8th among the states in comparative
view of the overall representative nature of state legislatures as calculated by
the Dauer-Kelsay method of assessing how representative state legislatures were
See David & Eisenberg, op. cit., supra note 20.
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was transferred to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond which
possessed exclusive jurisdiction in cases against State officials. The
move to the State court took cognizance of Judge Hoffman's dissent
in the Federal case and sought to exhaust State court remedies. Judge
Edmund W. Hening, Jr., of the Richmond court, delivered his opinion
on September 19, 1963. Citing precedents of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia in dealing with apportionment of congressional
districts in the State,47 Judge Hening suggested that the Virginia
Court's 1932 guideline that deviations from population equality had to
be grave and unreasonable to be invalidated might be a .preferable
standard by which to evaluate apportionment. 48 Judge Hening pointed
to the responsibility of persons who assail statutes as unconstitutional
to bear the burden of establishing it. He also was guided by a presump-
tion in favor of the reasonableness of legislative action. With these
premises, Judge Hening recited the small extremes of deviation in
Virginia's apportionment compared to those of other states and Vir-
ginia's comparative high standing among the states in the overall rep-
resentative character of the General Assembly. He concluded that the
disparities in Virginia districts were not invidious in view of the ac-
commodation of factors of compactness, contiguity, integrity of coun-
ty and city boundary lines, geographic features, and community of
interests. Judge Hening concluded that the 1962 acts were marked by
"an honest and fair discretion" exercised in "good faith" by the
General Assembly. The population disparities, he said, were "in every
way reasonable and a far cry from invidious discrimination." Judge
Hening also considered the effect of excluding military population
from the computation of extreme district ratios, although he viewed
the point unnecessary to the disposition of the case. He concluded
that if military population were excluded, the 1962 acts were even
more acceptable. Therefore, he upheld the 1962 acts. Although an ap-
peal to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was made, no action
had occurred when the U.S. Supreme Court finally acted on the Re-
apportionment Cases.
The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions revolved about the
principal opinion in Reynolds v. Sims,49 the case from Alabama. The
4 6VA. CODE, S§ 8-38 par. 9, 8-40.
47Wise v. Bigger, 79 Va. 269 (1884), and Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166
S.E. 105 (1932).
4STyler v. Davis, Civil No. B2908 Cir. Ct. of the City of Richmond, Va, Sept.
19, 1963.
4377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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court's opinion in Dasis v. Mann50 was written by Chief Justice Warren
with only Justice Harlan in dissent. The Supreme Court held that both
houses of the Virginia General Assembly were not apportioned suffi-
ciently on a population basis and that they were therefore unconstitu-
tionally apportioned, thereby sustaining the District Court decision.
Chief Justice Warren noted that in Reynolds v. Sims the Supreme
Court "held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned sub-
stantially on a population basis." Against that standard, the 1962 re-
districting acts were deficient in their relation to a population base.
Even though Virginia had reapportioned regularly, the Court said
"state legislative malapportionment, whether resulting from prolonged
legislative inaction or from failure to comply sufficiently with federal
constitutional requisites, although reapportionment is accomplished
periodically, falls equally within the proscription of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause." 51
The Supreme Court also explicitly rejected the argument that the
underrepresentation of Arlington, Fairfax, and Norfolk was constitu-
tional because of their large military-related populations. Chief Justice
Warren asserted: "Discrimination against a class of individuals, merely
because of the nature. of their employment, without more being
shown, is constitutionally impermissible." 52 In addition, the Chief Jus-
tice noted that there was no evidence that the legislature had "in
fact" taken military population into account in devising its apportion-
ment system, and cited the District Court's opinion in this regard. He
also took notice that Virginia statutes fostered voting by military-relat-
ed personnel by waiving registration and poll tax requirements for mili-
tary personnel and in applying the. same residence requirements for
voting to military personnel .as for other citizens.of the State. Even if
military personnel were to be. excluded from the population of legis-
lative districts, Warren pointed out, the.variations between the small-
est and largest districts, in each house would still be excessive. It is
difficult to ascertain what the Chief Justice contemplated by implying
that discrimination against a class of individuals might be sustained if
enough were shown. Ffuitheriore, in pointing out that the deviations
were excessive' even if 'such exclusions were permissible, the Chief
Justice seems to suggest that somehow not counting some individuals
because of employment can, be supported. It seems, however, that un-
50377 US. 678 (1964).. .
"5IdM at 691.
52bid.
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less employment carries very temporary residence, perhaps less
than the applicable State residence requirements, there are few in-
stances where exclusion would be justified.
The opinion proceeded to rebut the other arguments offered in sup-
port of the 1962 redistricting. The argument that the apportionment
was designed to balance urban and rural political power was met by
pointing out that urban areas in Virginia were not all treated in the
same fashion. The Court cited the adequacy of representation given
to Richmond in contrast to that extended to Arlington, Fairfax, and
Norfolk. This logical defect in the defense of the 1962 redistricting
had been obvious since the passage of the legislation. Examples of
other urban areas adequately represented in the 1962 statutes were
Virginia Beach, Lynchburg, and Danville. Allusions to the inequities
of the Electoral College in defense of the redistricting were also re-
jected by referring to the Court's rejection in Reynolds of the Federal
analogy argument.
The Court did not discuss remedies at length, but noted that
sufficient time remained before the next legislative elections to give
the General Assembly an opportunity to devise valid apportionment
statutes. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court had re-
tained jurisdiction in the case and assumed that the lower court would
take further action if the legislature failed to take constitutionally
valid action.
The District Court on September 18, 1964, reaffirmed its previous
order of November 28, 1962, but stayed enforcement until December
15, 1964, to give the General Assembly an opportunity to reapportion
both legislative houses.5 The District Court also declared that the
terms of incumbent senators would end at the expiration of the -terms
of the delegates elected in 1963. Thus, the Court interrupted'the 4-
year terms of the entire Senate, who were supposed to hold office until
January 1968. The Court also declared that the incumbent General
Assembly could enact legislation only after it had enacted a con-
stitutionally, valid apportionment plan. Finally, the Court retained
jurisdiction in the case in the event that the General Assembly -failed
to act or produced an unacceptable apportionment plan.
Judge Bryan justified the interruption of senators' terms in asserting
that to permitto act -in 1,966 a legislature composed of 1. consti-
tutionally valid house and 1 constitutionally invalid house would
not be constitutionally justifiable. Both houses form -a single legis-
53Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (ED. Va. 1964), order'on mhdatf-238
F. Supp. 459. 
. "I
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lature and to be constitutionally valid I house could not be per-
mitted to lag behind the other in the equality of representation.
This view took proper notice of the fact that the legislative process
involves both legislative houses, and that the principle of equal repre-
sentation in 1 house is effectively diluted if the 2d chamber is not
apportioned equally. To be effective, equal representation is re-
quired in both houses of a legislature, when viewed, as all of the ap-
portionment cases were, in terms of the right to vote. An individual
hardly realizes an equally effective vote if he has an equal voice in 1
house but a diluted vote in the 2d.
The State responded to the District Court's order by seeking a
stay to appeal again to the U.S. Supreme Court. But the petition was
denied without comment-M and Virginia faced the problem of devising
a constitutionally valid apportionment plan.
Governor Harrison called a special session of the General Assembly
to meet on November 30 to reapportion itself. Appropriate legislation
was passed by both houses on December 2 and signed by the Governor
on the next day so that the General Assembly could proceed to con-
sider other legislative matters. The patient wait by the legislature
for the Governor to affix his signature to the legislation reflected
the seriousness with which the General Assembly viewed the di-
rections of the District Court.55 The 1964 redistricting acts extended
to the areas involved in the litigation the representation to which
population entitled themY8 In addition to the 2 senators that Fairfax
County and Falls Church alone were to elect, Arlington was allotted
4 delegates; Norfolk its 7 delegates and a 3d senator; Fairfax County
and Falls Church were to elect 6 delegates, and together with Alex-
andria another delegate, and with Arlington County another senator.
The 1964 redistricting reduced the extreme variations between dis-
tricts in the House to 1.53-1.00 and in the Senate to 1.37-1.00. Majori-
ties of the membership could be elected by 47.7% of the population of
the State in the House and 48.2% in the Senate. The 1964 reapportion-
ment satisfied both the original plaintiffs from Northern Virginia and
the intervening plaintiffs from Norfolk: they did not return to the
court to seek additional corrective action.
To this point, the Virginia apportionment cases offered little in
the way of surprises in their progress or outcome. After Baker v. Carr
54Davis v. Mann, 379 U.S. 694 (1965).
55Daffron, Assembly Speedily Passes Bills to Redistrict Virginia, Lynchburg
News, Dec. 2, 1964, p. 1.
61964 Special Session Acts, c. 1 and 2.
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and the development of litigation elsewhere, it seemed that the Vir-
ginia apportionment was destined to be invalidated unless the U.S.
Supreme Court were to permit wide variations in the size of legislative
districts and thereby run the risk of committing itself to some fixed
tolerable ratio of inequality. This move would not only be inconsistent
with principles of equal representation but also invite difficulty in
uniformity, and exploitation by state legislatures. Even if the Court had
been more lax in interpreting the population requirements of equal
representation, Virginia was confronted with a historic reliance upon
population as the principal standard for apportioning both legislative
houses, with little evidence that military population was a factor seri-
ously considered by the General Assembly in redistricting in 1962 or
even uniformly evident, and with little consistency in the manner in
which some areas received overrepresentation and others underrepre-
sentation. It was difficult, therefore, to characterize the statutes as
rational in design.
The next and final stages of litigation affecting Virginia's legislative
apportionment raised more difficult questions, those of gerrymander-
ing. The 1964 reapportionment was challenged by 3 groups of voters
resident in the City of Richmond, Henrico County, and Shenandoah
County who alleged that because of the legislative districts in which
these governmental units were placed the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was violated. Three separate questions relating
to the districting process and its relation to the one man-one vote
principle of representation were raised. Judges Bryan, Lewis, and
Hoffman heard the suits, exercising the jurisdiction which the Court
had retained. 57
The Henrico County petitioners claimed that they were injured in
the effectiveness of the vote which they could cast because Henrico
County was combined with the City of Richmond into a single legis-
lative district to elect 8 delegates on an at-large basis. Therefore, it
was alleged that the 117,339 people of Henrico would suffer adversely
because, theoretically, the 219,958 people of Richmond would domi-
nate the district; hence, Henrico residents would not be able to elect
an Henrico resident to office. The Henrico petitioners noted that
Richmond alone was entitled to 5 delegates and Henrico County to
almost 3 by themselves. Noting that Virginia cities and counties
traditionally were allotted whole numbers of representatives when they
had sufficient population to merit them, the petitioners alleged invid-
ious discrimination to dilute the effectiveness of their votes. They
57 Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (ED. Va. 1965).
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also pointed to the fact that the 1964 reapportionment established
Richmond and Henrico as separate Senate districts.
The Court resolved the question by examining the composition of
legislative districts solely in terms of the population of the respective
districts. The claim of the Henrico citizens was rejected. The Court
cited Fortson v. Dorsey58 to note that multi-member districts and
multi-county or city-county districts are constitutional. Similarly,
the Court commented that because a legislator was elected fromone
part of a district rather than another did not invalidate the district, It
also commented that Henrico had not complained of the 1962 re-
districting when Henrico elected 1 delegate and shared 8 others with
Richmond.
.The Court: asserted that the principle of the integrity of city -and
county boundary lines was not violated because Richmond. and
Henrico still were separate Senate districts. Presumably alluding to
the rationale for bicameral legislatures, the Court saw no inconsistency
in having House districts devised differently from Senate districts. The
logic of the design was evidently to "'balance off minor inequities,"'
sanctioned in Reynolds. In further evaluating the rationale of the Rich-
mond-Henrico district, the Court noted the close geographic, resi-
dential, and economic interests of the 2 units. ....
'Central to the Court's validation of the district was the conclusion
that in neither Richmond nor Henrico did the district devalue -the
votes of residents. The Court was clearly impressed by the fact 'that
the 8 delegates allotted to the city and county each represented 42;164
persons, closer to -the ideal of 39,669 than the alternatives suggested
by Henrico. If Richmond were to elect 5 delegates, each would -rep-
resent 43,992 persons, or 90% of perfectly equal representation; if
Henrico elected '3 representatives each would represent 39,113 persons,
or 101% of perfectly equal representation. The 42,164 persons which
each of the 8 delegates represented under the 1964 reapportionment
amounted to 94% of ideally equal representation. Hence the deviation
from equality was only 6% -under the 1964 acts but -would be 10%
under the alternative proposal. Because the 1964 statutes provided
"representation fairly nearing the par," the Court refused to invalidate
the district.5 9 In addition to the other factors cited above, the popula-
tion equality feature of the district seemed to determine the outcome.
• An allegation of racial gerrymandering was made by Richmond
Negro citizens against the same Richmond-Henrico delegate districts
M379 U.S. 433 (1965).
5 9 Mann v. Davis, supra note 57, at 245.
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although they also leveled the same charge against the Richmond
Senate district, which was elected 2 senators-at-large throughout the
city. They stressed that Negroes constituted 42% of the population
of Richmond but only 29% of the population of the combined Rich-
mond-Henrico district. Thus, it was contended that by being united
with predominantly-white Henrico County, Negroes in Richmond
suffered a dilution of the effectiveness of their vote insofar as it would
be more difficult to elect a Negro to the General Assembly. The
remedy sought was "twofold. First, it was suggested.-that Richmond
and Henrico County be separated as delegate districts so that each
political subdivision elected its own delegates. The proposal paralleled
that of the Henrico residents in suggesting that Richmond. elect 5
delegates and Henrico 3 delegates. Second, it was suggested. that the
5 delegates, and the 2 senators, then elected from Richmond should be
elected from single-member districts of equal population. The re-
sult, it was suggested, would make Negro votes effective so that a
Negro might be elected to the legislature. This effect would-follow
because Negroes in Richmond lived in compact areas, and *ith single-
member districts Negroeswould elect at least 1 delegate and possibly I
of the 2 senators. To marshal arguments in support of thii position,
the Negro residents suggested, that the intent of the State's constitu-
tional and statutory provisions was to elect legislators from districts
without regard to county and city boundary lines. They thus alleged
a deprivation of rights under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
Judge Bryan disposed -of these contentions rather' summarily in
upholding the validity of Rchmond-Henico district against this at-
nack. First, Bryan noted the upholding of the district against"-the
challenge of Henrico'Courity residents. Second, he concluded that the
discrimination on racial grounds was not evident in the case. The
at-large system of representation, Judge Bryan emphasized; had deep
historic roots in Virginia legislative elections. Single-member district-
ing or subdistricting had never been used in Virginia cities or counties
entitled to more than a single legislator. With this background, it
was clearly difficult to prove that continued adherence to multi-mem-
ber distxicts was motivated by racial considerations. Judge Bryan bui-
tressed his conclusion by noting the at-large system for electing Rich-
mond city councilmen, "without question by either race?" 0 The
consistent record of using multi-member districts in particular made
the case for single-member districts difficult to sustain. Perhaps the
6llhid.
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more effective argument for a dilution of the Negro vote lay in the
challenge to the Richmond-Henrico district. But the general problem
of proving racial discrimination in diluting voting rights is illustrated
by the conflicting claims put forth by Richmond Negroes on the one
hand and Henrico whites on the other. Each group claimed an attempt
to dilute the votes of residents of each of the 2 components of the
district. The Negro cause was undoubtedly damaged by the Henrico
claim which, it should be stressed, was equally genuine.
Judge Bryan's response to the allegation of racial gerrymandering
was:
The concept of "one person-one vote" we understand, neither
connotes nor envisages representation according to color. Certain-
ly it does not demand an alignment of districts to assure success
at the polls of any race. No line may be drawn to prefer by race
or color.81
This view of the question was in accord with the U. S. Supreme
Court's decision in Wright v. Rockefeller8 2 and even with the prin-
ciples enunciated in dissent in that case by Justice Douglas, whom
Judge Bryan quoted in his opinion. The District Court's hesitancy to
act on these gerrymandering questions was mirrored by subsequent
judicial reluctance to enter the morass this issue involved. The virtues
of relying upon population as the primary standard of the one man-one
vote principle and putting the burden upon the State to explain devia-
tions from a population standard was evident in the Court's accepting
approximations of population equality in gerrymandering allegations
and allocating the burden of proof to those charging a gerrymander.
The disposition by the Court of the gerrymandering allegation by
Shenandoah County residents also illustrates the reliance upon the
population standard in examining the validity of districts. Shenandoah
County with its 21,825 population had constituted a single district
to elect 1 delegate in the 1962 redistricting, and hence was one of the
most overrepresented areas in the State. But the 1964 reapportionment
placed Shenandoah County along with Page County, with its popula-
tion of 15,572, into a legislative district with Rockingham County and
the City of Harrisonburg, which made for an additional population
of 52,401, to elect 1 delegate. But Rockingham and Harrisonburg
alone constituted another district to elect 1 delegate, an application of
Virginia's use of "floater districts." The Court focused upon the 4-
61jbid.
62376 US. 52 (1964), cited in Mann v. Davis, supra note 57, at 245.
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unit district and noted that district's deviation from the ideal district
population of 39,669. The injustice of the district's size was com-
pensated for Rockingham and Harrisonburg by their additional dele-
gate, but "Shenandoah with Page suffers from a clear underrepre-
sentation." s Invidious discrimination against Shenandoah County thus
was proved. The Court found the disparity in population figures alone
sufficient to prove the discrimination, as it had when examining the
1962 statutes in the absence of any demonstration of rationale by the
State. The contrast to the Court's approach in the Richmond-Henrico
district is obvious and without population equality as a feature of the
Shenandoah situation the district was doomed.
The Court itself acted to correct the Shenandoah situation be-
cause of the proximity of the filing dates for candidates in the primary
election. The Court felt there was not enough time for the General
Assembly to meet to rectify the situation. The Court set aside the 1964
act's provisions concerning the 2 districts and the 4 governmental
units and ordered that Harrisonburg, Rockingham, Page, and Shenan-
doah counties constitute a single district to elect 2 delegates. Each of
the 2 delegates, then, the Court noted, would represent 45,380 persons,
"above the proper ratio" but not "an unfair approach in the circum-
stances." " The Court also expressed its approval of the 1964 act.
Efforts by the Henrico and Richmond citizens to have the U. S.
Supreme Court review the dismissal of their allegations were unsuccess-
ful.65
II. CONGRESSIONAL DisTucTs
Congressional districts in Virginia have also been subjected to attack
in court. The 1962 session of the General Assembly which reap-
portioned the legislature did not redistrict the State's 10 congressional
districts. The 1960 Census had revealed population disparities from
356,000 to 539,000 among the congressional districts.
The Commission on Redistricting, reporting to the 1962 legislature,
concluded that it was unnecessary to reapportion congressional repre-
sentation.6 The Commission's logic was that the failure of the State to
lose a congressional seat as a result of the census permitted existing
districts to continue to be valid. The Commission's view was that
congressional districts, if valid when created, remained valid despite
63Mann v. Davis, supra note 57, at 246.
0I4bid.
WBurnette v. Davis, 382 US. 42 (1965).
OGREPoRT OF THE COMMISSION ON REDISTRICTING, op. cit., supra note 28, at 6-7.
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subsequent changes in their populations. The Commission conceded
that there were considerable population disparities among legislative
districts. To remedy such disparities, the Commission concluded,
would require the abandonment of a consistent Virginia practice, the
principle of the integrity of county and city boundary lines in con-
structing congressional districts. The Commission also suggested that
to alter overpopulated districts would violate other relevant districting
criteria, such as contiguity, compactness, and community of interest.
For these reasons, and acknowledging the extensive continuity of
service by Virginia Congressmen, which the Commission noted might
be upset by rearranging districts, no congressional redistricting plans
were offered. This conclusion was postulated despite the citation of
the requirements of § 55 of the Constitution.
The first constitutional reference to a principle of equality in con-
gressional district apportionment was found in the 1830 Constitution6
which required congressional representation to be "apportioned as
nearly as may be amongst the several counties, cities, boroughs, and
towns of. the State, according to their respective numbers." The
numbers of course included only 3/5 of slaves and excluded "Indians
not taxed." :
The origins of the provisions of § 55, requiring congressional dis-
tricts to be composed of "contiguous and compact territory contain-
ing as -nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants," are found
in the 1851 Constitution. 8 That Constitution provided that the State
was to be divided into districts of "contiguous counties, cities and
towns, be compact, and include, as nearly as may be, an equal number
of the population." Similar provisions were found in the 1864 and 1869
Constitutions. 9 The modifications of this language in the 1902 Consti-
non, which now are effective, appear not to have been a matter of dis-
cussion at the 1901-02 Convention.
- The suit by Norfolk residents attacking congressional districts in
Virginia, styled Wilkins v. Dauis,70 was -initiated in State courts, and,
since a -iolation of the State Constitution was alleged, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia heard the case in the first instance.
71
Behind the litigatioi in 1963 lay a direct precedent in Virginia on
the very question of congressional districts: Brown v. Saunders in
.6 7VA. CoNsr. 1830, art. "III, 6.
6
8 VA. CoNsr. 1851, art. IV, §5 13-14.
6 9VA. CoNsT. 1864, art. IV, Hi 13-14; VA. CoNSr. 1869, art. V, iS 12-15.'
7OWilkins v. Davis, 205 Va. 803, 139 S.E. 2d 849 (1965). .
71VA. CoN sr., art. VI, 5 88.- .:
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193272 had invalidated the congressional districts enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly in that year. The Virginia Supreme Court had decided
Brown strictly on State constitutional grounds in matching the 1932
redistricting against § 55 of the Constitution. The Court in Brown
conceded the impossibility of achieving mathematical equality of dis-
tricts and the inevitability of some variation from the ideal size,
particularly when in Virginia there was an "unbroken custom to re-
frain from dividing any county or city into separate districts." 73
The Court traced the use of population as the standard for congres-
sional districts in Virginia for over 100 years and declared:
Mathematical exactness, either in compactness of territory or
in equality of population, cannot be attained, nor was it contem-
plated in the provisions of section 55. The discretion to be exer-
cised should be an honest and fair discretion, the result re-
vealing an attempt, in good faith, to be governed by the limita-
tions enumerated in the fundamental law of the land. No small
or trivial deviation from equality of population would justify or
warrant an application to a court for redress. It must be a grave,
palpable and unreasonable deviation from the principles fixed by
the.Constitution. No exact dividing line can be drawn 74
Moving on to the merits of the case, the Court asserted:
Applying these principles to the facts, there can be no uncer-
tainty in the conclusion to be reached in the case under considera-
tion. The inequality is obvious, indisputable 'and excessive. No
argument is needed. It is demonstrated by the statement of facts75
Hence, the Court invalidated the 1932 redistricting .and ordered the
State's 9 congressmen elected at large.
Table II, which is set forth .on page 320, illustrates the variations in
the populations of the 9 districts in 1932 and of the 10 districts in 1964.
It is clear that the 1964 districts had greater disparities in their absolute
population size than those in 1932. The extent of underrepresentation
of the Second and Tenth districts in 1964 was significant. However,
the ratio of the largest to the smallest district in 1964 was 1.69 to 1
compared to 1.83 to 1 in 1932.
A petition for a writ of mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court




751d. at 45. -
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TABLE II
POPULATION OF VIRGINIA CONGRESSIONAL DrsTR cps, 1932 AND 1964
1932 1964
Percent Percent
Variation Varia- Variation Varia-
from tion from tion
DiSTRICr Popula- Ideal from DisTRiCr Popula- Ideal from
tion Size Ideal tion Size Ideal
Size Size
1 ....... 239,835 -29,257 -10.9 1 ...... 422,624 + 27,182 + 6.9
2 ....... 302,715 +33,623 +12.5 2 ...... 494,292 + 98,850 +25.0
3........ 288,939 +19,847 + 7.4 3...... 418,081 + 22,639 + 5.7
4 .... .. 212,952 -56,140 -20.9 4 ...... 352,157 - 43,235 -10.9
5 ....... 251,090 -18,002 - 6.7 5 ...... 325,989 - 69,453 -17.6
6 ....... 280,708 +11,616 + 4.3 6 ...... 378,864 - 16,578 - 4.2
7 ....... 336,654 +67,562 +25.1 7 ...... 312,890 - 82,552 -20.9
8 ....... 183,934 -85,158 -31.6 8 ...... 357,461 - 37,469 - 9.6
9.......325,024 +55,932 +20.8 9. 364,973 - 30,469 - 7.7
....................... 10 ...... 527,098 +131,656 +33.3
269,092 = Ideal population per district 395,442 = Ideal population per district
to compel the State Board of Elections to certify only candidates at
large for election to Congress because the existing districts violated
S 55 of the Virginia Constitution and rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. The decision in Wilkins v. Davis was handed down on
January 18, 1965, in an opinion written by Justice Buchanan.7 6 The
Court invalidated the 1952 redistricting acts and ordered that until the
General Assembly enacted constitutionally valid congressional dis-
tricts, only elections at large for Congress could be held.
The Court rejected the defendant's arguments that military popula-
tion could properly be excluded in determining the number of in-
habitants in congressional districts. Justice Buchanan reported that
the Court was "not convinced that the military personnel constitute
a permissible exclusion." 77 He noted that military population were
included in the determination that Virginia was entitled to 10 congress-
men. The Court also cited Dais v. Mann78 in rejecting the military
personnel.deductibility.argument.
Justice Buchanan then proceeded to determine whether the varia-
tions in the district populations were excessive. He noted the diffi-
culties of drawing district lines to achieve mathematical equality and
to achieve effective community of interest, remarked that "from the
standpoint of community of interest alone this record would show
"MSupra note 70.7lSupra note 70, at 808.
7sSupra note 57, cited in Wilkins v. Davis, supra note 70, at 809.-
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little reason for disturbing the boundaries of the present districts,"
and continued:
But community of interest is not the only requirement, or even
one of the requirements spelled out in the Constitution. There
must be, as nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants
in the districts.7
The Court then proceeded to note the inequalities in the districts,
particularly those in the Second and Tenth districts. The Court con-
cluded that the record did not disclose that the districts as composed
were as nearly equal as practicable, or that alternative districts could
not be constructed that were as equal as practicable as well as compact
and contiguous. Because the requirements of § 55 were violated, the
districts were invalid.
Justice Buchanan also pointed out that the congressional districts
were invalid when pitted against the U.S. Constitution. He cited the
U.S. Supreme Court holding in Wesberry v. Sanderss0 that Article I
required members of the House of Representatives to be chosen by
the people. Wesberry had held that "as nearly as is practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as an-
other's," and that "it was population which was to be the basis of the
House of Representatives." After reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's
actions and opinions in Baker v. Carrs' and Reynolds v. Sims,8 2 the
Virginia Court concluded that the congressional districts could not be
upheld because they violated the Federal Constitution "as construed
and applied" by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Justice Buchanan affirmed the duty of the General Assembly to
reapportion the congressional districts so that the constitutional re-
quirements of equality of population and compactness and contiguity
were realized. In addition, the General Assembly could "so far as can
be done without impairing the essential requirement of substantial
equality in the number of inhabitants among the districts, give effect
to the community of interests within the districts." 83 But clearly, to
the Court, substantial equality of population was the most vital in-
gredient of a constitutionally valid apportionment plan. The remedy
the Court offered was at-large elections if the General Assembly failed
to reapportion congressional districts.
79Wilkins v. Davis, supra note 70, at 810.
80376 U.S. 1 (1964).
81369 U.S. 186 (1962).
82377 US. 533 (1964).
83Supra note 70, at 813.
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Once again, Governor Harrison called the General Assembly into
special session for reapportionment purposes. The special session con-
vened on August 31 and met for only 4 days. New congressional dis-
tricts were enacted which were based on substantial equality of popu-
lation and preserved what seemed feasible, of the compactness and
contiguity requirements." Even community of interest considerations
seemed to be accommodated. No challenge to the 1965 congressional
districts was forthcoming and the first elections under that districting
scheme were held in the primary election on July 12, 1966.' The
populations of the 10 districts and the disparities among them: ard con-
tained in Table IM. The ratio of the largest district to the smallest is
now merely 1.11 to 1.
TABLE III
PoPuLATIoN OF 1965 VIRGINIA CONGRESSIONAL DisTICrs,:
Percent
Variation Variation
DisTRieT Population from from
Ideal Size Ideal Size
1........... ........... 401,052 + 5,610 .. +1.4
2 ................................. 419,642 +24,200 -+6.1
3 ....... . . ......".......... 408,494 .+ 13,052 . . 3
4...... * :.................... ... 386,712 - 8,730 :,-.2
5 .................................. 386,179 - 9,263 -2.4
'6 ..................... ......... ... 381,611 -13,831 .:,-.3.5
7 ................................. 377,511 -17,931 q4.5
8 .................................. 398,951 + 3,509 " 0:9
9 .................................. 386,965 - 8;477' . -2.1
10 .................................. 407,312 +11,870. ' +3.0
395,442 - Ideal population per district
The litigation which. produced reapportionments of Virginia .legis-
lative and congressional districts has not yet produced any revQlutions
in the constitutional, legal, or political systems of Virginia. The impli-
cations of Wesberry85 and Reynolds"0 require the use of. population
as the. standard for future apportionment, but this standard is clearly
not new to Virginia. The primary effect of the decisions is to ,return
Virginia to the apportionment standard to which in its own Constitu-
tion the State committed itself many years ago. It also marked a return
to the legislative standard the State itself applied until the 1950 Census
841965 Special Session Acts, c. 1.
85Supra note 80.
SGSupra note 82.
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demonstrated the increasing urbanization, and its concentration, in the
Commonwealth. Attempts to dilute the population standard since 1950
have been arrested and reversed by the litigation, and future efforts
to amend the standard prevented.
The ultimate political effects of these cases in Virginia are unclear.
Efforts to prevent urban populations from wielding political weight
equivalent to their numbers has failed, hence the urban character
of the State will be reflected in legislative as well as executive institu-
tions. Policy-making in the State, therefore, will take place in the con-
text of equal voting power for all of the State's people. This return
to the traditional Virginia view of representation offers the State
the opportunity to reassert its vital governmental role in responding to
the needs of the Commonwealth as perceived by its people. Political
realities under a one man-one vote standard will insure this response.
It is preferable to retain the democratic principles of Virginia
government even through involvement in the "Reapportionment Rev-
olution" than to have distorted them through legislative action.
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